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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the influence of aptitude test scores on
black and Hispanic representation in Navy enlisted occupations (or
ratings) from 1982 through 1990. A procedure to control for the
influence of aptitude test scores is introduced and explained along
with a system for categorizing enlisted ratings by their
relationship to the Navy's stated mission. Graphical depictions of
black and Hispanic representation in Navy occupations are then
shown by aptitude group and occupational category. This is
followed by a brief examination of minority participation in the
Navy's petty officer paygrades from 1982 through 1990. The results
of the study reveal that the disproportionate representation of
minorities in Navy ratings persists even when aptitude is
controlled, suggesting the importance of factors unrelated to
aptitude in determining representation. The thesis concludes with
a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology
used to measure the influence of aptitude scores on minority
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This study attempts to estimate the influence of aptitude
test scores on the occupational placement of blacks and
Hispanics in the U.S. Navy enlisted force. The study analyzes
the distribution of black, white, and Hispanic enlisted men
among the Navy occupational specialties (or ratings) for the
years 1986 and 1990 and compares the results to findings from
1982, for which the data have been previously analyzed. 1
In addition, this study examines the distribution of these
minority groups by enlisted paygrade within each occupational
area, particularly those in which the group appears to be most
disproportionately represented.
B. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of the Navy Affirmative Action
Plan, or NAAP, is to "attain a minority enlisted population
that as a minimum reflects the percentage of minorities in the
general population." [REF. 1] The Navy achieved this goal for
1 The terms "Hispanic" and "black" are used to provide
consistency with past military Equal Opportunity research.
More contemporary terms are "Latino" and "African-American.
"
For simplicity, the terms "white" and "black" are used
throughout to refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic
blacks. It is recognized that Hispanics may be members of any
racial group.
blacks in 1983 and has exceeded it every year since. For
Hispanics, as of fiscal 1990, Navy recruiting efforts have not
kept up with the rapid rise of this segment of the U.S.
population. Hispanics currently account for approximately 6
percent of the Navy and 8 percent of the U.S. population. 2
Of more relevance to this research is an additional goal
of NAAP, closely related to the above, which mandates that,
"within legal constraints (i.e., proper qualification),
minorities participate equitably in all occupational areas."
[REF. 1] The extent to which this particular goal is
achieved, the relevant factors impeding or promoting
attainment of the goal, and the possible implications for the
Navy form the primary focus of the study.
It has been well documented that minorities are not
proportionately represented across the military's occupational
specialties, including ratings in the Navy [REF. 2] . For
example, in the fiscal 1989 Navy Equal Opportunity Assessment,
an attempt was made to evaluate minority representation in
Navy occupational specialties using Department of Defense
(DOD) occupational groupings [REF. 2] . A listing of ten of
the DOD occupational groups, with their Navy rating
equivalents, are presented below in Table 1. While numerous
DOD group codes were listed in the Equal Opportunity report,
2 This comparison of Hispanic representation in the Navy
with that in the general population is somewhat misleading
because the Hispanic population is considerably younger than
the white population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991).
the point can be made by listing only the most overrepresented
and most underrepresented ratings.
TABLE 1
Minority Representation in Selected Navy Enlisted Ratings:
The Five Most Overrepresented Ratings and the Five
Most Underrepresented Ratings
Five Most Overrepresented Ratings
Percent Minority Percent Over-
Navy Rating Representation * represented
Ship Serviceman 60 115
Disbursing Clerk 52 84
Mess Specialist 50 79
Dental Technician 47 67
Radioman 41 4 6
Five Most Underrepres anted Ratings
Percent Minority Percent Under-
Navy Rating Representation * represented
Aviation Technician 12 -58
Electronics Technician 12 -58
Fire Control Technician 11 -60
Musician 10 -64
Sonar Technician 8 -71
* "Minority" is defined here as any non- white. Total
minority representation of the Navy's enlisted force in
fiscal 1989 was 28.1 percent.
Source: CNO Study Group's Report on Equal Opportunity in the
Navy (1989) .
Even though minority representation in Table 1 is not
broken out into individual racial/ethnic groups, and the
conversion inaccuracy notwithstanding, one can readily
conclude that a fair measure of disparity exists within these
occupations. Interestingly, the fiscal 1990 version of the
same report went the extra step to delineate minorities by
separate racial/ethnic groups (such as Asian -American, Pacific
Islander, and Hispanic) for both men and women. These were
specified in numerical and percentage format. However,
because of what appears to be a printing error, not all DOD
groups were listed in the table of minority percentages. Of
the DOD groups listed in Table 1 that were included, there
showed so little change, positive or negative, as to be
negligible [REF. 3]
.
In 1988, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) commissioned
a special Study Group on Equal Opportunity in the Navy. The
study group's first report to the CNO stated that one goal of
the Navy's Affirmative Action Plan should be to ensure an
equitable distribution of minority enlisted personnel among
all ratings and occupational fields in order to optimize
minority upward mobility. The fiscal 1990 Equal Opportunity
Assessment Report showed that minority representation remains
unevenly distributed across the Navy rating structure and that
minorities are underrepresented in the more technical ratings
[REF. 3]
.
Although there are no specific minority goals for
individual Navy ratings, "equitable representation" is based
on the proportion of minorities (by individual ethnic group)
within the Navy's enlisted force at the end of a particular
fiscal year [REF. 4] . For example, at the end of fiscal 1990
blacks and Hispanics accounted for 17.6 percent and 6.1
percent, respectively, of all persons in the Navy's enlisted
ranks. The assumption here is that blacks and Hispanics
should also represent approximately these percentages of
people assigned to separate Navy ratings throughout the
enlisted force. However, this assumption, or expectation,
appears to give little or no weight to factors such as
qualifications for entrance, personal preference, or even
gender restrictions. These important considerations are
addressed in a later chapter.
A comprehensive examination of the effectiveness of the
Navy's Affirmative Action Plan with regard to occupational
placement and advancement of blacks and Hispanics was
conducted by Gary J. Zucca, a former Navy officer, while at
the University of Florida in 1984. A sizable portion of his
work was devoted to an assessment of minority representation
in occupational specialties. An attempt is made to replicate
Zucca 's study in this thesis and to show what, if any, changes
may have occurred in minority representation over the past
eight years since he performed his analysis.
Zucca found that, after controlling for education and
aptitude, blacks and Hispanics were overrepresented in non-
technical occupations and underrepresented in the more
technical fields [REF. 5] . (Zucca uses the term "support
technology." This is discussed below.)
This came as no surprise to informed observers. However,
Zucca also found that black and Hispanic overrepresentation
actually increased in non- technical ratings in direct relation
to the degree of qualification required for entrance into
those ratings. This refutes the notion that disproportionate
minority representation can be attributed solely to lower
aptitude levels. He asserts, then, that a significant number
of highly qualified minorities are being "tracked" by Navy
career counselors into support, rather than technical, ratings
[REF. 5] .
Zucca' s study supports the view that "racial inequalities
in representation with regard to occupational placement . . .
are not explainable by the differences in human capital of
Navy recruits" [REF. 5] . Such a finding justifies the
existence of the Navy Equal Opportunity Program and, more
specifically, the Navy Affirmative Action Plan. This thesis
attempts to replicate the study by Zucca and compare his
results with the latest data now available. The primary
research objectives are: (1) Assess the accuracy and
validity of Zucca' s methodology for controlling for aptitude
in the Navy's occupational placement process; and (2) Assuming
Zucca's procedure to be valid, and using his 1982 results as
a basis of comparison, apply his methodology to the most
current data and assess the present occupational distribution
of blacks and Hispanics in the Navy.
C . BACKGROUND
Present issues can be placed in perspective by looking
first at the history of minorities in the Navy. The presence
of blacks in the Navy dates back to the colonial era and the
days of sail. At the time, the ideal sailor was experienced,
agile, quick to obey, willing to endure danger and discomfort,
and sober. Any able-bodied man who came close to fulfilling
this ideal was welcome in the Navy. Race was a secondary-
issue. [REF. 6]
Following the Civil War, attitudes toward blacks in the
Navy rapidly changed. The policy of the Navy changed for a
combination of reasons, but it basically followed the
prevailing "Jim Crow" attitudes and legislation of the period.
With the passage of time, the status of blacks on ships came
to reflect the diminished condition of their civilian brothers
ashore. Racism was becoming so deeply ingrained in American
life that whites would rarely work with blacks.
1. The Steam Age
In the steam age the Navy was looking for a new type
of enlisted man, possessing skills and talents very much
unlike those demanded of wooden- ship sailors. Further, the
growing fleet, consisting of larger and more numerous ships,
required more volunteers than previously. The new Navy thus
depended upon young, white volunteers whose attitudes
generally reflected the racist mentality that was taking hold
throughout the nation. Rather than risk alienating potential
white recruits, the Navy accepted few, if any, blacks, and
segregated those in the service from their white shipmates.
[REF. 6]
The presence of blacks on ships became a source of
discontent among white crew members and often resulted in
violence. Since assignment within the ship determined messing
and berthing arrangements, naval authorities succumbed to the
practice of concentrating blacks in certain specialties that
kept them isolated from the rest of the crew. Since it was
believed by some at the time that blacks could not be trained
in the complexities of steam engineering and electricity, they
were relegated to the specialties of cook, messman, and
steward. Additionally, believing that whites would take
orders only from a member of their own race, the Navy withheld
promotions from blacks so that progressively fewer attained
the status of petty officer.
The manpower demands of World War I did little to
affect the racial composition of the Navy. Of some 238,000
enlisted men on active duty in 1919 (a few months after the
fighting ended but before demobilization began) , roughly 6,000
were black, less than three percent of the total [REF. 6]
.
8
From 1919 to 1933 the Navy adopted a policy of
refusing to accept new recruits who were black. In this post-
war demobilization period, all vacancies, except among
stewards and messmen, were filled by whites. Consequently, by
the end of 1941 the Navy had just twenty-nine black sailors
who were not messmen [REF. 6]
.
Like the Army, the Navy entered World War II as a
racially segregated service, but blacks and whites were kept
separate in a different fashion. The Army tried to maintain
a specific number of units manned entirely by blacks (but
commanded by whites) , that were housed and employed in a
manner that would minimize their contact with white soldiers.
In contrast, the Navy enforced segregation by occupation.
Black sailors, therefore, might serve with whites in a large
warship, but with rare exceptions all of the blacks prepared
and served food or waited upon the ship's officers. Because
they performed the same duties, blacks could easily be
segregated, eating and sleeping together separate from the
rest of the crew. [REF. 6]
Again, like the Army, the Navy eventually modified its
racial policy to meet the demands of war and, to a lesser
degree, public sentiment. But official directives did not
alter reality. The Navy still enlisted relatively few blacks,
assigned the largest concentration of blacks to ladling out
food, and provided just a minimal degree of integration into
ships' crews. [REF. 6]
2. Post-World War II
In 1948 President Truman enacted Executive Order 9981.
This order decreed equality of treatment and opportunity for
all persons in the armed services without regard to race,
color, religion, or national origin. The directive was
greeted with scant enthusiasm by the services, but it
nonetheless represented an important milestone in race
relations. [REF. 6]
The Navy's expansion for the Korean War attracted more
black recruits than could be absorbed in the steward's branch,
thus forcing the service to broaden opportunities for training
in other specialties. In 1956, with the last of the wartime,
three-year enlistments expiring, three-fourths of the 37,000
blacks in a 591,000-man force received assignments to the
general service [REF. 6]
.
In the 1960s, under Secretary of Defense McNamara, the
Navy continued to broaden opportunities for blacks, which
subsequently benefitted all minorities. Prejudicial attitudes
of some whites persisted, however, and a period of racial
tension marked by episodes of violence ensued. Like their
civilian counterparts, blacks in the Navy were now demanding
equal and fair treatment.
By 1970, when Admiral Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval
Operations, the proportion of black officers in the Navy stood
at just 0.7 percent. At the same time, blacks represented
just 5.5 percent of the Navy's enlisted force, about half the
10
proportion of blacks in the general population [REF. 6] .
Zumwalt attempted to encourage the recruitment of more blacks
into the Navy by relaxing enlistment standards. However,
recruiting stations still relied heavily on aptitude tests to
make occupational assignments for enlisted men. Zumwalt'
s
decision to lower standards to attract additional black
recruits proved self-defeating, for no systematic effort was
made to help them overcome their educational shortcomings. As
a result, a majority of blacks could not score well enough on
aptitude tests to qualify for many of the more desirable
ratings. Consequently, low skill and menial labor occupations
became or remained overrepresented by blacks.
As American participation in the Vietnam fighting
diminished, draft calls declined, and pressures to enlist in
the Navy to avoid the Army infantry rapidly eased. The
declining pool of draft- induced volunteers forced Zumwalt, in
his effort to broaden the racial composition of the service,
to accept blacks with poor records of past achievements as
well as low test scores. Unfortunately, test scores remained
a key to training and assignment. Thus, the majority of these
new sailors could not qualify for technical training and were
relegated to the least desirable jobs in the Navy.
Within a year after the end of the draft, the
proportion of black enlisted men in the Navy increased from
5.5 percent to 8.1 percent. In that year, 1974, blacks made
up 11 percent of first- term volunteers, marking the first time
11
that the proportion of black recruits matched the level of
black representation in the general population [REF. 6]
.
Despite this progress, inequities for blacks could
still be found in promotions, occupational selection and the
administration of justice [REF. 6] . Equal opportunity and
affirmative action programs were inaugurated throughout the
early 1970s to address these problems.
The history of minorities in the Navy centers mainly
on the experiences of blacks. Hispanics were not identified
as a separate ethnic group for reporting purposes until 1976. 3
Shortly afterward, Asian- Americans, American Indians, Alaskan
Natives, and Pacific Islanders were differentiated as
individual racial/ethnic groups and separated from the
traditional "Other" category.
3 Prior to 1976, "Hispanics" were identified on the basis
of their surname. In 1976, the method of determining Hispanic
status was changed to self - identification (Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute, 1989.
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II. NAVY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN
A. DESCRIPTION
The foundation of the Navy's equal opportunity program, on
the personal level, is indoctrination and training of all
personnel regarding equal opportunity issues. On the
institutional level, equal opportunity is putting into action
policies and programs that provide appropriate opportunities
to all employees for upward and lateral mobility, thus
enhancing quality of life. The flagship of these programs is
the Navy Affirmative Action Plan (NAAP)
.
The NAAP identifies specific categories in which the Navy
will take positive, affirmative steps to achieve a
demographically balanced composition of personnel, ensuring
fair treatment and freedom from discrimination. Among the
categories to be monitored are accessions, assignments,
promotions, discipline, and utilization of skills
(occupational placement)
.
The NAAP is designed as a continuing program of goals and
actions with realistic milestones. The impact of NAAP is
assessed on an annual basis, and milestones are revised and
updated by comparing statistical trends within each category,
as well as through verbal feedback from cognizant commands.
[REF. 1]
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According to the Navy's own studies, there is ample
evidence of a skewed distribution of minorities along the
spectrum of occupational specialties [REF. 3] . Specifically,
minorities tend to be underrepresented in the more technical
ratings. That finding, in and of itself, would not
necessarily justify an affirmative action program. The Navy's
definition of affirmative action is "the taking of positive
steps to correct or eliminate present or future institutional
discrimination that decreases equal opportunity due to race,
color, national origin, religion, or gender, and all traces of
past discriminatory policies or practice." [REF. 1] To merit
consideration for affirmative action, the unequal occupational
distribution of minorities must somehow be shown to be the
result of institutional bias.
To be sure, as discussed in Chapter I, the history of the
Navy is replete with personnel policies and practices that
have discriminated against racial/ethnic minorities,
particularly blacks. It is debatable whether remnants of
these policies and practices still exist. However, since
occupational placement of minorities is listed as one of
twelve major points in the NAAP, one must assume that the Navy
believes some remnant of these practices still survive in one
form or another.
The primary tool for both the screening of potential
enlistees and the assignment of individuals to military
occupations is the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
14
(ASVAB) [REF. 4] . Performance on the ASVAB is the basis for
determining whether a new recruit is qualified for the Navy's
career fields and training programs. Based on an applicant's
score and his or her personal preferences, the individual is
assigned a date to commence a training program, if any, with
designation as an occupational specialist in a field upon
completion of the program.
B. APPLICATION
The Job-Oriented Basic Skills (JOBS) program is a
potentially powerful weapon of the Navy Equal Opportunity
Office to combat disproportionate minority representation.
JOBS is an intensive course of basic and remedial instruction.
It is provided to a select group of new recruits who show
promise but lack the formal education to score high enough on
the ASVAB to qualify for the more technical training programs
("A" schools) . The dependence on JOBS as a key element in an
ethnic/occupation balancing strategy stems from acknowledgment
that a large number of minorities need help to attain
qualifying scores for entry into the more technical "A"
schools.
Figure 1 below shows the percentage of new recruits, by
racial/ethnic group, who score above or below the 50th
percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) . The
AFQT is a composite of verbal and quantitative subtests from
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the ASVAB. It is not used directly in the job assignment
process. [REF. 7]
As seen in Figure 1, there has been a marked increase in
the proportion of Hispanic recruits scoring above the 50th
percentile on the AFQT from 1984 to 1989. In that same
period, the proportion of white and black recruits with scores












New Recruits Who Scored Above and Below AFQT 50
By Racial/Ethnic Group, FY 1984 and FY 1989
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If the minority aptitude deficiencies depicted above can
be overcome in sufficient numbers through the JOBS program
alone, then proportional attendance at the "A" schools should
eventually be achieved. Consequently, occupational
specialties would eventually become racially balanced.
The Navy classification and assignment process was
computerized in 1984 under a system named Personalized
Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Entry (PRIDE) . PRIDE is
a system used in assigning applicants to specific "A" schools
for which they may qualify, matching an applicant's personal
preference and qualifications. CLASP, (for Classification and
Assignment within Pride) is a computerized model or algorithm
that matches available training programs with applicant
information and generates a list of programs which the
applicant is offered. In 1988, PRIDE was found ineffective in
distributing minorities among all ratings. The CLASP
algorithm was subsequently adjusted to promote a more
representative distribution of blacks and Hispanics. As yet,
it is too soon to evaluate the results of the adjustment.
[REF. 4]
ASVAB scores are currently the primary determinant in the
"A" school assignment process. As such, poor performance on
the ASVAB (sometimes erroneously equated with a "lack of
skills") prevents many minorities from attending the more
desirable "A" schools. This circumstance no doubt accounts
for at least some disparity in ethnic representation within
17
Navy jobs. Exactly how much of the disparity can be




Zucca proposes three models to analyze the representation
of minorities in Navy occupational specialties [REF. 5] .
These three models are the Cohort model, the Self-interest
model and the Core Technology model. He developed these
models to explain the occupational distribution of ethnic
groups in a complex organization (i.e., the U.S. Navy) after
implementation of an affirmative action policy. Of the three
models, Zucca seemed to be most satisfied with the results of
what he terms the Core Technology model. This model views an
organization in terms of its core and peripheral technologies.
As applied to the Navy, core technology specialties include,
for example, those involving the operation of weapons and
propulsion systems aboard ships and aircraft. Peripheral
specialties are those involved with support and
administration. Yeomen, Mess Specialists, and Corpsmen are
examples
.
Zucca' s other two models attempted to account for
additional possible factors in the placement process. One
looked at the cohort effect, that is, how an aberration in the
cohort of entry- level recruits tends to perpetuate over time
up the rank structure. The other studied the notion that
19
persons in power positions tend to protect and nurture along
members of their own ethnic identity. Zucca conceded the two
models were plagued with methodological problems, and he was
somewhat dissatisfied with the results of both.
Under the widely held notion that organizations desire to
protect their core technology from outside influence [REF. 8]
,
this model suggests that occupational specialties which
represent the core technologies of the Navy are traditionally
white (and "male" as well) and that personnel in power
positions within the organization tend to maintain them as
such. Hence, Zucca' s "Core Technology Hypothesis": All
factors being equal, minority groups will be overrepresented
in peripheral occupational specialties and, conversely,
underrepresented in core technology specialties.
The Core Technology model appears to be the most valid of
Zucca' s three models. This model is replicated here and
described more fully below in Chapter IV. The most recent
data available to Zucca at the time of his research were from
the year 1982. The present study analyzes the data for the
year 199 0, currently the most recent available. In addition,
1986 data are used to provide a bridge of continuity from




Any study such as this must consider the influence of a
cohort effect. Specifically, if there were an
underrepresentation of a particular minority among a cohort of
qualified entrants into a certain occupational specialty in
the past, this same underrepresentation, or "crimp," should
remain with the cohort as it progresses through the years of
service and up the rank structure.
Since the Navy only accepts recruits at the entry level,
it would take a considerable amount of time (perhaps ten or
twenty years) after the implementation of an effective
affirmative action plan for the results to manifest
themselves. Consequently, there is a considerable delay
between plan conception and accomplishment of specified goals
of the program throughout the entire paygrade strata.
Executive Order 11246 of 1972 required the military
services (and all government agencies) to implement an
affirmative action plan. Even if the plan were fully
effective, there would have been only ten years of progress
before Zucca did his study. Thus, he was hampered to some
degree by the cohort effect. He recognized this and developed
a separate model to account for this influence.
Coming eight years after Zucca, this study expects a
lesser influence of the cohort effect. There should have been
sufficient time since the implementation of an affirmative
action program for anticipated changes to have occurred. Of
21
course, perfect implementation cannot be presumed to take
place, as Zucca showed quite well in 1982. It is the extent
of implementation since Zucca' s research that is now the
issue.
C. DATA SET LIMITATIONS
This study, like Zucca' s, compares the distribution of
black and Hispanic ethnic groups across occupational
specialties and paygrades with that of their white
counterparts. Zucca examined the distribution during the
years 1976, 1979, and 1982. This study adds to that with
results from the years 1986 and 1990.
Blacks and Hispanics were selected for study because they
represent by far the largest of the minority groups in the
United States. "Whites," as group, are used as a focal point
for comparison for blacks and Hispanics. Together, these
three racial/ethnic groups account for 93 percent of the male




This study is limited to men only who are Navy petty
officers, or enlisted personnel in paygrades E-4 through E-9.
The reasoning behind this restriction is that all petty
officers have one and only one selected occupational
specialty. Although some enlisted personnel in paygrades E-l
through E-3 also have designated specialties, most do not.
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Additionally, the seven construction ratings (generally
referred to as Sea Bees) are not included in the data since
they operate rather autonomously, outside the Navy promotion
and selection mainstream. Finally, the ratings of legalman,
master-at-arms, and Navy career counselor were deleted because
these ratings contain only paygrades E-6 through E-9 and their
members are laterally transferred in from other Navy
occupational specialties.
Zucca realized that core technology occupations generally
require higher skill levels than do peripheral occupations.
However, he was still faced with the problem of distinguishing
between occupations that are involved with core technology and
those exclusive to peripheral technology. In complex
organizations the line delineating the two is often blurred at
some point and difficult to distinguish. Each category
contains some specialties that could be conceived as properly
belonging, at least in part, to the other. Obviously, some
subjective decisions were made on the part of Zucca in the
categorization process. Regardless, for continuity purposes
this study maintains the same subsets of occupations as did
Zucca [REF. 5] . Of course, some ratings have been deleted and
others added in the eight years since Zucca conducted his
analysis; so, again, some judgments are necessary concerning
the categorization of borderline ratings.
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D. APTITUDE AS A FACTOR
To determine the degree to which aptitude influences
distribution, one must first isolate this factor from all
other possible factors. Since ASVAB scores are the only-
measure of aptitude used in the occupational placement
process, these scores become the targeted variable. By
developing a procedure for isolating the influence of
aptitude, one can then control for it. Having accomplished
this, one can essentially eliminate the "aptitude" variable
from the job placement process. By measuring any residual
imbalance of minority proportions, one can then estimate the
original influence when differences in aptitude were present.
This is precisely what Zucca set out to accomplish with
his "Core Technology" model [REF. 5] . The fact that Navy-
enlisted minorities are underrepresented in the more technical
ratings is well documented in the literature on personnel
issues [REF. 7] . To further assert that this
overrepresentation is nearly as marked after accounting for
the differences in aptitude, as Zucca has done, should call
for a serious inquiry into the matter.
When Zucca' s findings were published in the Summer 1986
edition of Armed Forces & Society , fellow researchers in the
manpower field took note. By controlling for aptitude prior
to determining rates of overrepresentation and
underrepresentation of minorities in occupational fields,
Zucca was essentially dismissing the Navy's explanation of
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"lack of qualification" as justification for distributional
discrepancies
.
Revelations such as these warrant a double- check. By
replicating Zucca's work, that is, running his Core Technology
model using the most recent data (as well as intermediate data




A. THE USE OF ASVAB
The measured differences in aptitude scores from one
ethnic group to the next has generally served to displace, or
at least effectively mask, the presence of other factors that
may contribute to disproportions in minority representation
within Navy ratings. One must be able to control aptitude to
ascertain the influence of factors other than aptitude
involved in the placement process. To best do this, the
variable should possess the proper attributes. Naturally, the
variable must first be common to all members of the data set.
In addition, it must be easily quantifiable and readily
accessible. The ASVAB scores of new recruits fit all three
criteria
.
As previously mentioned, all recruits are required to take
this vocational aptitude battery as part of the enlistment
process. The results of the test are used to determine
eligibility for enlistment as well as for occupational
training. The ASVAB consists of ten separate subtests,
reflecting a gamut of skills and technical knowledge [REF. 7] .























Various combinations of these subtests are used to form
aptitude composites. These composites are chosen and applied
based on their ability to predict training performance for
broad classes of occupations within the Navy [REF. 7]. For
example, "Basic Electricity/Electronics," an aptitude
composite used to screen recruits for several specialties in
this field, combines the subtests General Science (GS)
,
Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) , and Mathematics Knowledge (MK)
(which is also given a double-weighting) . Occupational
specialties grouped within these broad classes require a
minimum score to qualify for the training program (or "A"
school) associated with that specialty. For example, the "A"
school leading to designation as an Electrician's Mate may
require a minimum score of 200 on the composite mentioned
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above [GS + AR + (2xMK) ] . To qualify for Air Traffic
Controller school, a minimum score of 210 on the same
composite may be required. 4
B. APTITUDE GROUPS
A means for controlling for aptitude was introduced by
Zucca in 1984. Zucca realized the need to find a common basis
by which to compare the many diverse occupations of the Navy.
There exists no direct method to judge the difference in
aptitude levels required for each of the Navy's ratings. The
aptitude composites used to screen recruits for each rating
are generally unique and quite often contain no subtest in
common with composites used for other ratings. For this
reason, Zucca developed a method for standardizing each
composite score. This methodology is described below.
To control for the aptitude variable (ASVAB scores) , it is
necessary to first rank each rating in descending order by the
minimum score required for entrance into that rating's "A"
school and then group the ratings based on the order of their
ranking. Because most ratings use a unique combination of
ASVAB subtests, ranking of minimum scores cannot be done
directly. Each subtest is standardized to a mean of 50. An
average standardized score for each rating may be obtained by
4 These minimum scores are called "cut scores" and are
obtained by summing the standard scores for each subtest in
the composite. The other services use a different procedure
or scale in setting their composite cut scores.
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dividing the composite minimum score by the number of subtests
forming the composite. Based on this average score, all
occupational specialties can be ranked and placed into one of
three "aptitude" categories (low, medium, or high) , with
roughly one- third of enlisted petty officers falling into each
slot. Table 2 provides the range of the computed average
standardized scores and their breakdown into aptitude groups.
TABLE 2
Aptitude Groups (by Score Range) Used in the Study
Aptitude Group Score Range *
Low 45.0-49.0
Medium 49.1-51.6
High 51.7 - 55.0
* Scores were calculated by dividing the composite minimum
score for each rating's "A" school by the number of subtests
forming the composite.
Looking at the medium aptitude group above, the scores
making up this category fall into a relatively small range on
either side of the mean (50) . The small variance associated
with this "bunching" effect precipitated rather inconsistent
and confusing results. Consequently, findings emanating from
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the medium aptitude group are discounted to a large extent.
Nonetheless, the occupational ratings falling on either
extreme of the aptitude spectrum- -the high and low aptitude
groups- -have the greatest potential for overrepresentation or
underrepresentation of minorities. These extremes are of
greatest interest to this study, the model is only slightly
degraded by the limitations of the medium aptitude group.
Based on the ASVAB scores of new recruits depicted in
Figure 1 in Chapter II, one would expect to find a smaller
percentage of both blacks and Hispanics than of whites in the
high aptitude group. Similarly, one expects a larger
percentage of both minorities, as compared to whites, in the
low aptitude group. Table 3 below shows the racial/ethnic
composition, in percent, of each of the aptitude groups.
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TABLE 3
Percentage Distribution of Male, Navy Petty Officers in




White Black H:LSp Total White Black Hisp Total
High 88 9 3 100 83 12 5 100
Medium 87 10 3 100 80 15 5 100
Low 82 14 4 100 76 18 6 100
All Petty
Officers 85 12 3 100 80 15 5 100
Source : Defense Manpower Data Center.
As shown in Table 3, the percentage of whites decreased
within every aptitude level from 1982 to 1990.
Correspondingly, the percentage of blacks and Hispanics in
every aptitude group increased over the eight -year period.
(This is consistent with the percentage decrease in whites and
the percentage increase in blacks and Hispanics in the petty
officer population as a whole, as depicted in Table 6 in
Chapter V.) Table 3 above also reveals another expected
pattern. The higher the aptitude defining each group, the
greater the representation of whites relative to both blacks
and Hispanics. The degree by which this disparity is present
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lessens somewhat in 1990, but the same pattern persists.
Since both of these trends are consistent with demonstrated
parameters of the petty officer population at large, a measure
of validity can be attributed to the ASVAB normalizing
procedure mentioned above.
C. DIFFERENCE INDICATORS
The statistic used to summarize and describe the
distribution of blacks and Hispanics in the petty officer
population, the Difference Indicator, was first introduced for
military use by Nordlie et al . (1975). This method assumes
that all ethnic groups are randomly distributed throughout the
population. For instance, if Hispanics constituted 7 percent
of the Navy's petty officer population, under this assumption,
one would also expect Hispanics to account for 7 percent of
each occupational specialty. Any difference between the
minority composition of the particular rating and the petty
officer population as a whole is calculated in the Difference
Indicator.
The formula for calculating the Difference Indicator (DI)
,
as used by Nordlie et al . (1975) and later by Zucca (1984) , is
as follows:
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DI = [ (Actual Number / Expected Number) x 100] - 100
Where:
Actual Number = The number of members of a particular
ethnic group in the category of
interest
.
Expected Number = The number of members of the ethnic
group of interest one would expect to
find if members of that group were
randomly distributed throughout the
population.
The Expected Number is derived by multiplying the percent
of the minority group in the aptitude group by the total
population in that category. For example, from Table 3 above,
we know that for fiscal 1990, among the group of ratings
requiring the highest aptitude, 12 percent of that group is
black. Therefore, the Expected Number (of blacks) of any
subset of that group would be the total number of members of
that group times 12 percent.
The Expected Number is divided into the actual number to
form a ratio. This ratio is than multiplied by 100 so it can
be expressed as a percent. Finally, 100 is subtracted from
the result so that, when the actual and expected numbers are
equal, the DI equals zero, rather than 100. This means that
any "overrepresentation" of the minority group appears as a
positive number and any "underrepresentation" appears as a
negative number. Continuing with the example, suppose the
subset of interest from the highest aptitude group contains
1,000 members. Of those, 100 are black. The Expected Number
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(of blacks) would be 120 (from 1000 x 12 percent) . Solving
for the Difference Indicator (DI)
:
DI = [(100 / 120) x 100] - 100
= - 16.6
The negative sign here denotes underrepresentation. The
16.6 indicates that, for this particular subset of ratings, at
this particular aptitude level, blacks are 16.6 percent
underrepresented
.
The selection of the base line population (from which the
Expected Number is calculated) is crucial to the determination
of the DI . This is where Zucca deviates from Nordlie and
others [REF. 5]. Nordlie et al . (1975) used the entire
enlisted population of the Army as the basis for computing the
expected percentage of each ethnic group. This assumes that
minorities are distributed evenly without regard to their
individual qualifications. This was far too broad for Zucca,
as his emphasis was on controlling for the qualification
variable. In Zucca 's model the expected percentage used as a
base only those enlisted personnel with the level of
qualification required for the particular set of specialties
being evaluated.
The Navy Equal Opportunity Office, in its annual
assessment of equal opportunity and affirmative action
programs already in place, uses the same equation for
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calculating DIs as does Nordlie et al . and Zucca. However,
the Navy's version, called the Minority Representation Index
(MRI) , like that of Nordlie et al
.
, incorporates the entire
enlisted community as a base for relating expected percentages
of minorities. As previously discussed, this approach assumes
that all ethnic groups are proportionately identical across
the qualification spectrum for all specialties, aptitude
requirements notwithstanding.
If this assumption were true, then the Expected Number
would be the same, regardless of method of derivation. If
this assumption were not true, which is more likely to be the
case, then the Nordlie and the Navy versions introduce a
margin of error into the calculated indices.
D. OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES
Occupations were categorized according to the job
description for each occupational specialty. Every Navy
rating was assigned to either Core, Core Support, or Support




(1.) CORE TECHNOLOGY : Ratings involved in the operation of
propulsion, detection, or weapons
systems aboard ships and aircraft.
(Example: Sonar Technician)
(2.) CORE -SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY : Ratings whose primary job
functions are to maintain and
repair equipment directly
associated with the operation of
ships and aircraft.
(Example: Aviation Structural Mechanic)
(3.) SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY : Ratings that provide logistic,
medical, and administrative support to
the operating forces.
(Example: Disbursing Clerk)
Table 4 below shows the number of ratings, and the number of
petty officers in these ratings, by both occupational category
and the three aptitude levels.
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TABLE 4
Number of Navy Ratings and Petty Officers
By Occupational Category and Aptitude (Apt) Group, 1990
CORE CORE -SUPPORT SUPPORT TOTAL
Apt # of # of # of # of # of # of # of # of
Group Rtgs Pty Off Rtgs Pty Off Rtgs Pty Off Rtgs Pty Off
High 14 43,345 13 36,111 13 28,135 40 107,591
Med 9 25,277 5 29,977 6 6,675 20 61,929
Low 11 65,694 5 16.225 7 27,825 23 109,744
Total 34 134,316 23 82,313 26 62,635 83 279,264
Source : Defense Manpower Data Center.
The Difference Indicators, or DIs, were calculated for
each of the paygrade tiers, E-4 through E-6 and E-7 through E-
9, within each qualification category for the years 1986 and
1990. If the model hypothesis is correct, that is, if the
organization seeks to "shield" its core technology from
outside influence (i.e., minorities), one would expect to see
DIs for the core technology category to be greater (i.e., more
positive indices) than the DIs in the core support and support
categories. Further, since level of qualification has been
controlled by the categorization of ratings with nearly equal
aptitude levels, the model suggests that the DIs within any
one category of ratings should be roughly equivalent.
37
V. RESULTS
A. NAVY ENLISTED DEMOGRAPHICS
Navy enlisted population demographics, shown in Table 5
below, have generally continued the same trends evident in the
last two decades. Specifically, the proportion of both blacks
and Hispanics has steadily increased and the proportion of
whites has steadily decreased. The proportion of all ethnic
groups composing the "Other" 5 category has stayed relatively
constant. It can be seen in Table 5 that the proportions of
both blacks and Hispanics have increased even as the size of
the enlisted force has grown. Recall, from Figure 1, that
even though recruitment of blacks has been on the rise, the
average scores on the ASVAB of these new recruits have shown
little or no increase over time. On the other hand, the
scores of Hispanic recruits have increased markedly over the
past few years.
5
"Other", in this case, refers to members of the ethnic
groups "American Indian/Alaskan Native" and "Asian





Percentage Distribution of Total Navy Enlisted Force
By Racial/Ethnic Group, FY 1982 and FY 1990
Fiscal Total
Year White Black Hispanic Other Percent Number
1982 78.4 12.4 3.2 6.0 100.0 481,679
1990 70.7 17.7 6.1 5.5 100.0 501,542
Source : Defense Manpower Data Center
B. DATA SET DEMOGRAPHICS
The pattern of change in the Navy enlisted force, as shown
in Table 5, is carried over into the Navy's petty officer
corps (paygrades E-4 through E-9). It is this enlisted corps
that is of most concern here, since petty officers constitute
the vast majority of enlisted personnel with designated
occupational specialties (or ratings) . Table 6 shows the
changes that have occurred in the racial/ethnic representation
of petty officers between 1982 and 1990.
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TABLE 6
Percentage Distribution of Navy Petty Officers
By Racial/Ethnic Group, FY 1982 and FY 1990
Fiscal Total
Year White Black Hispanic Other Percent Number
1982 80.3 9.8 2.7 7.2 100.0 300,247
1990 73.9 14.9 4.8 6.4 100.0 312,804
Source : Defense Manpower Data Center.
This study attempts to determine what portion of the
disparities in minority representation within the Navy's
occupational ratings can be directly attributed to differences
in the aptitude levels of new recruits. This can be done by
controlling for the "aptitude level variable, " and removing it
from the occupational placement "equation." Once done, any
remaining disparities in minority representation can be
quantified and measured. These remaining disparities must
then be attributed to factors other than aptitude
differentials
.
This procedure necessitates removing as many variables
from the placement equation as possible. By restricting the
data set to petty officers, every member in the set will have
one and only one occupational designation. Further, by
excluding women from consideration, legal and policy
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constraints relating to female occupational placement are
avoided. Finally, this study is limited to blacks and
Hispanics, the two largest racial/ethnic groups in the U.S.
and the two groups that are traditionally included in
assessments of institutional discrimination. The data set
thus consists of male petty officers who are in the white,
black, and Hispanic racial/ethnic groups only.
Table 7 shows the change in the make-up of this data set
over a fourteen-year period. The table expresses changes in
the ethnic groups as they relate to each other only, since all
other ethnic groups have been omitted.
TABLE 7
Percentage Distribution of Male Petty Officers
By Racial/Ethnic Group, Selected Fiscal Years, 1976-1990
Fiscal
Year White Black H ispan ic Total*
1976 91 7 2 100
1982 86 11 3 100
1986 84 12 4 100
1990 80 15 5 100
Note: The base population excludes persons in racial/ethnic
groups other than those shown here. This tends to raise the
proportions depicted here relative to other proportions that
are for the population as a whole. Other racial/ethnic
minorities represented between 5 and 7 percent of the male
petty officers over this period.
Source : Defense Manpower Data Center.
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As expected, and very much like the distribution of the
total petty officer population depicted in Table 6, the
percentage of whites steadily decreases with a corresponding
increase in the percentages of both blacks and Hispanics. One
would expect, based on the information in Table 7 alone, that
the rise in minority petty officers would be reflected in a
proportional rise in the representation of all Navy ratings.
Given the information regarding recruit ASVAB performance
in Figure 1, showing the overall lower scores for blacks as
compared to Hispanics, and to a greater degree whites, one
would then expect a rise in the black composition of Navy
ratings requiring lower ASVAB scores. Based on the same
information, one would expect to find increased representation
of Hispanics in the ratings requiring higher ASVAB scores and
the decreased representation of this group in ratings
requiring lower scores.
C. RESULTS FOR BLACKS
To compare actual representation with "expected, " the
Difference Indicators (DIs) have been graphed. Figure 2
presents the graph of all male, black petty officers in the
high and low aptitude groups. (The medium aptitude group has
been omitted due to the very small variance associated with
the narrow range, resulting in inconsistent DI values.) The
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horizontal axis denotes the three occupational categories into
which all Navy ratings have been allocated. The vertical axis
shows the percent of overrepresentation (positive values) and
underrepresentation (negative values) by blacks in each
occupational category for both high and low aptitude groups.
The bars from left to right show the DIs for the years 1982,
1986, and 1990, respectively.
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Core Core Suppt Support
HIGH APTITUDE
Core Core Suppt Support
LOW APTITUDE
1982 £22 1986 1990
Note: Expected Percentage, High Aptitude Group, 1990 = 12.2
Expected Percentage, Low Aptitude Group, 1990 = 17.9.
FIGURE 2
Black Representation Indices of Occupational Categories
By Aptitude Group, Selected Fiscal Years, 1982-1990
By placing under a single aptitude group only those
occupational categories whose member ratings require that
particular level of aptitude, the effects of differences in
aptitude have effectively been controlled. For example, as
stated in the note to Figure 2 above, blacks constitute 12.2
percent of the membership of all ratings that require the
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highest level of demonstrated aptitude (as measured by ASVAB
scores). Consequently, all else being equal, blacks should
theoretically constitute 12.2 percent of personnel assigned to
ratings requiring that level of aptitude.
The degree to which each occupational category differs
from the expected percentage (in the example, 12.2 percent) is
indicated by the graph of the Difference Indicators in Figure
2. Continuing the example, blacks in Core occupations during
1990 are shown to be 25 percent underrepresented. This means
that the ratings making up the Core category- -ratings involved
with weapons, detection, and propulsion systems (e.g., Sonar
Tech and Operations Specialist )- -have 25 percent fewer blacks
than the cohort of all ratings belonging to that aptitude
group as a whole.
Similarly, in the Support category of the high aptitude
group- -consisting of ratings in the administrative, medical,
and logistic fields (e.g., Yeoman and Storekeeper) - -blacks in
1990 are 92 percent overrepresented. This translates to an
average composition of 23.4 percent [(12.2 x .92) + 12.2] of
blacks for the ratings in that category at that aptitude
level
.
It is readily apparent from Figure 2 that, at both the
high and low aptitude levels, blacks are underrepresented in
the Core and Core Support categories. At the same time,
blacks are heavily underrepresented in the Support categories.
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Comparing the high aptitude group to the low aptitude
group, one can see a similarity in pattern, but a measurable
difference in degree. The amount of underrepresentation or
overrepresentation in the low aptitude group is about half
that of high aptitude group.
D. RESULTS POR HISPANICS
The Difference Indicators for Hispanic representation,
displayed in Figure 3, resemble the results for blacks to a
remarkable extent. Again, in the highest aptitude group, the
minority (Hispanics in this case) , is underrepresented in both
the Core and Core Support categories and vastly
overrepresented in the Support category. Likewise, in the low
aptitude group, the Core and Support categories mirror the
negative representation directions of blacks, but the Core
Support direction is positive.
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Core Core Suppt Support
HIGH APTITUDE
Core Core Suppt Support
LOW APTITUDE
1982 £23 1986 1990
Note: Expected Percentage, High Aptitude Group, 1S90 = 4.6
Expected Percentage, Low Aptitude Group, 1990 = 5.6.
FIGURE 3
Hispanic Representation Indices of Occupational Categories
by Aptitude Group, Selected Fiscal Years, 1982-1990
It is important to note in Figure 3 that the trend of the
Difference Indicators from 1982 to 1990 has been heading
toward the zero baseline. This is true for every occupational
category, regardless of aptitude group. A zero index value
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would indicate Hispanic representation consistent with the
Expected Percentage in each aptitude group.
E. RESULTS BY PAYGRADE
Dividing the data set of Navy petty officers by paygrade
assists in the further analysis of the results.
1. Paygrade Description
Dividing the petty officer data set into the six
individual petty officer paygrades, E-4 through E-9, can help
to reveal patterns of occupational choice over time. For
instance, many people in the junior petty officer ranks (E-4
through E-6) in 1982 were in the senior petty officer ranks
(E-7 through E-9) in 1990.
For purposes of simplicity in presenting the data,
results for each paygrade will not be graphed. Rather, the
same information is conveyed, in a more concise manner, by
dividing the six paygrades into two groups. The natural point
at which to make the division is between the paygrades E-6 and
E-7. The Navy views members in paygrades E-4 through E-6 as
front-line supervisors. Those in paygrades E-7 through E-9
are considered senior supervisors and managers. Further, once
the level of E-7 is attained, a sailor is deemed to be a
"careerist," or one who intends to stay in the service until
at least the 20-year point.
Table 8 shows the ethnic composition of each of the
two subsets of the data set. Again, the years 1982 and 1986
48
are added to 1990 to reveal any trends manifested by
composition changes over time. The total number of members in
each subset for the selected years is listed in the far right





Percentage Distribution of Male, Navy Petty Officers
By Paygrade and Racial/Ethnic Group, Fiscal
Years 1982, 1986, and 1990
E-4 through E-6
Fiscal Tol:al*
Year White Black Hispanic Percent Number
1982 84 13 3 100 210,336
1986 83 13 4 100 245,263
1990 79 16 5 100 249,097
E-7 through E-9
Fiscal Total*
Year White Black Hispanic Percent Number
1982 92 6 2 100 36,570
1986 92 6 2 100 41,280
1990 89 8 3 100 42,564
* Note: The base population excludes persons in racial/ethnic
groups other than those shown here. This tends to raise the
proportions depicted here relative to other proportions for
the population as a whole.
Source : Defense Manpower Data Center,
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Two aspects of Table 8 are noteworthy for the purpose
of this study. First, the percentages of black and Hispanic
petty officers are much larger in the E-4 through E-6 subset
than they are in the E-7 through E-9 subset. Consequently,
the Expected Percentages used in calculating the DIs for each
subset are proportionately larger for the junior petty
officers than for their senior counterparts.
Second, from the totals in the column to the far right
of Table 7, it can be seen that the rate of growth in the
petty officer ranks has been faster in the four-year period
from 1982 to 1986 than during the next four-year period to
1990. During the more rapid growth of the first period, the
proportions of the three racial/ethnic groups remained
virtually unchanged. However, between 1986 and 1990 there was
a considerable increase in the proportions of black and
Hispanic petty officers within the two paygrade groupings.
2. Results For Blacks By Paygrade
The Difference Indicators for blacks by paygrade in
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Note: "High" and "Low" refer to aptitude groups
FIGURE 4
Black Representation Indices of Occupational Categories
By Aptitude Group and Paygrade, Fiscal 199
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The pattern of disproportionate black representation
is the same for both paygrade subsets as it is for the black
petty officer population as a whole. (See Figure 2) With the
exception of the high aptitude Core category, however, the
subset of E-7 through E-9 shows less disparity in levels of
representation than does the E-4 through E-6 subset. In
nearly all ratings, then, senior black petty officers are more
proportionately distributed than their junior counterparts.
3 . Results For Hispanics By Paygrade
The graph of Difference Indicators for Hispanics by
paygrade, presented in Figure 5 below, stands in stark
contrast to that of blacks. Like blacks, in every occupation
category, the direction of representation is the same for both
paygrade tiers. But, in the case of Hispanics, those in the
senior paygrade grouping are farther from the zero index of
"expected" representation (in some categories, much farther)
than those in the junior grouping. This stands in contrast to
the trend found for black petty officers.
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E-4 - E-6 £23 E-7 - E-9
Note: "High" and "Low" refer to aptitude groups.
FIGURE 5
Hispanic Representation Indices of Occupational Categories




The primary purpose of this study is to estimate the
influence of aptitude test scores on the distribution of
blacks and Hispanics within the Navy's enlisted occupations or
"ratings." It is well -documented that these minority groups
tend to be underrepresented in the Navy's more technical
ratings. On the other hand, these same groups tend to be
overrepresented in the less technical support and
administrative positions [REF. 3].
It is also well -documented that Hispanics and blacks have
lower scores than whites, on average, on the tests designed to
measure aptitude for occupational training assignments [REF.
4] . What is not well -documented is how much of the disparity
in the representation of minorities can be attributed to their
generally lower test scores. This study attempts to fill some
of that void.
The promotion rates for personnel in different Navy
occupations tend to vary somewhat, depending on the type of
work being performed and its value to the organization.
Advancement, for example, tends to be more rapid in the
technical ratings than in the non- technical ones [REF. 4] .
For this reason, the distributional disparity for minorities
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falls in the highly visible realm of "equal opportunity, " and
so deserves a considerable degree of attention.
B. ANALYSIS
From Table 6 we can see that both blacks and Hispanics are
assuming a steadily increasing percentage of the Navy's petty
officer force. From Table 8 it can also be seen that this
proportional growth has taken place in the senior petty
officer ranks as well as in the ranks of junior petty
officers, particularly over the last four years.
How this influx of minority petty officers is distributed
throughout the Navy's occupational structure is of key
importance. These new petty officers will set the tone, or at
least provide a strong indication, of the effects of programs
designed and implemented to remedy entrenched distribution
imbalances.
If this cohort falls into the same occupational placement
pattern as their racial/ethnic counterparts of earlier years,
the distribution problem will not merely be perpetuated, but
will actually be exacerbated. If, on the other hand,
affirmative action recruiting policies and education programs
have had their desired effect, an appreciable lessening in
minority disproportions should be noticed.
It appears, from the results of this study, that blacks
and Hispanics have followed quite different paths over the
past eight years in the selection of their occupations. Hade
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representation in the various Navy ratings, already known to
be skewed, has, at best, maintained the status quo. Indeed,
it is quite likely that the degree of disproportionality has
increased over the time period of this study. Hispanic
representation, never quite as skewed as that of blacks,
appears to be on a course toward parity.
1. Analysis of Black Representation
Referring to Figure 2, the story of black
representation in the three occupational categories used in
the Core Technology model can be readily discerned. In
analyzing the data presented in the Figure, one must keep in
mind the "Expected Percentage" differences between aptitude
groups. Because black recruits achieve generally lower
scores than whites on the ASVAB, one cannot realistically
expect blacks to be proportionately represented in ratings
that have the highest aptitude test score requirements.
When the aptitude variable is controlled, it is
determined that blacks should constitute 12.2 percent of
personnel in ratings requiring high aptitude, and 17.9 percent
of the personnel in ratings requiring low aptitude. (From
Table 3, blacks constitute 15 percent of the sample petty
officer force.) Even allowing for this difference in expected
representation, black participation in the high aptitude
categories is radically disproportional . Blacks, for reasons
not completely explained by differences in aptitude test
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scores, have been entering the Navy's Support occupations in
relatively greater numbers than their white counterparts. The
opposite trend has occurred in the Navy's Core and Core
Support areas
.
In the low aptitude categories, the disproportionality
of black petty officers is more moderate. (Indices of under
20 percent could probably be considered "acceptable. ")
Representation is nearly consistent with the 17.9 percent of
blacks that scored at this aptitude level on the ASVAB. Even
so, blacks are still considerably overrepresented in the
Navy's Support category ratings. The pattern from Figure 2 is
clear: the higher the level of aptitude required for the
occupation, after acknowledging differences in expected
percentages, the greater the respective degree of disparity in
the representation of blacks.
When blacks are grouped by junior and senior
paygrades, as shown in Figure 4, the degree of disparity from
the zero index is greater for the juniors. This seems to
imply that junior petty officers are following the example set
by their senior counterparts and are entering occupations that
are already overrepresented by blacks, but doing so at an even
greater rate. (The possibility was investigated that blacks
are more evenly distributed in the senior petty officer ranks
due to higher retention at the careerist level than whites.
However, it was found that there is only a slight difference
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in reenlistment rates between white and black petty officers
at the third and fourth enlistment points 6 [REF. 3].)
Figure 2 clearly shows the trend of black
representation in Navy ratings over the eight -year period
studied. In that span, it is disturbing to note no
appreciable change in most of the categories. The exception
is in the Core Support category in the low aptitude group.
Here, representation went from a positive 10 to a negative 20.
The direction of change is noteworthy, but a 20 percent
differential is still fairly minor. With respect to the
distribution of black petty officers, affirmative action
programs in the past eight years have apparently maintained
the status quo, at best.
2. Analysis of Hispanic Representation
Hispanic trends in occupational representation, as
depicted in Figure 3, appear to indicate a moderate degree of
success for affirmative action programs. While disparities
exist, they are not as pronounced as with blacks. In only one
category is the difference index greater than plus or minus 20
percent. That category, Support in the high aptitude group,
6 Blacks reenlist at a higher rate than whites when only
the pool of those eligible to reenlist is considered.
However, blacks experience a lower eligibility rate than do
whites. Consequently, when both eligibility and reenlistment
rates are factored together, the actual difference in black
and white proportions before and after enlistment points is
quite small.
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a traditional haven of minority overrepresentation, has
declined by one- third from 1982 to 1990.
The eight -year period covered by Figure 3 indicates
movement by Hispanics toward the zero index (an "optimum"
reflecting a level of expected representation) in every
category. This trend is also observed in Figure 5. The
degree of Hispanic overrepresentation or underrepresentation,
in every category, is less for petty officers in the E-4
through E-6 paygrades than for those in the paygrades of E-7
through E-9. Clearly, junior enlisted Hispanics coming into
the petty officer ranks are entering previously
underrepresented occupations in greater numbers as opposed to
areas of traditional Hispanic overrepresentation.
C. THE INFLUENCE OF APTITUDE
While this study attempts to separate the effects of
differences in aptitude levels from the occupational placement
process in general, and from occupational representation of
minorities in particular, clearly there exists a relationship
between the two. The fact that new Hispanic recruits are
scoring much higher on the ASVAB than Hispanic recruits of six
or seven years ago, and that Hispanic representation in all
occupational areas is much more proportional now, cannot be
passed off as coincidental. Likewise, the fact that the
aptitude test scores of blacks entering the Navy have remained
relatively low can certainly be linked to the finding that
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there are still wide disparities in the occupational
representation of this group.
Nonetheless, it has been shown in this study that the
disparity associated with minority representation cannot be
attributed solely to differences in ASVAB test scores. A
considerable degree of disroportionate representation in Navy
ratings remained after an attempt was made to control for the
possible influence of aptitude. How much of the aptitude
variable has been controlled in this study is not completely
clear. The controlling procedure applied here does not lend
itself to absolute verification.
The procedure used to control for the aptitude variable,
introduced by Zucca (1984), cannot be mathematically verified
or even assigned a statistical degree of certainty. Some
assumptions were made where solid data were not available. To
be sure, comparing aptitude levels between such widely varying
occupational fields as aircraft mechanic and cook is a
daunting task. Indeed, few researchers have attempted such an
endeavor. To venture forth into this frontier at all is to
invite criticism. Any such forays are to be commended.
Nevertheless, some shortcomings of the procedure should be
noted:
1. Even though all of the ASVAB subtests are standardized
to an identical mean of 50, a direct comparison of various
subtest composite averages may be faulty. If two composites
to be compared had several subtests common to both, then a
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certain amount of validity could be granted to the procedure.
But comparing two composites with no subtests in common is
walking on thin ice. As it happens, many composites do
contain common subtests. All composites contain either the
subtests "Mathematical Knowledge" or "Arithmetic Reasoning,"
and many contain both. Additionally, "Word Knowledge" appears
in more than half of the composites.
2. Composite score minimums are generally validated
against success in occupational training and help the Navy
determine which recruits are "trainable" in a given program.
However, these minimum scores are flexible, and they may be
raised or lowered based on manpower requirements or space
availability in the training pipeline. At the same time,
there are limits on the range of score flexibility, at least
on the low end; and, historically, the Navy has attempted to
keep the minimum required scores constant over time.
Enlistment standards are more likely to change. Occupational
standards, in contrast, are viewed as an "anchor" for
personnel quality or a way of maintaining continuity in
training programs and job staffing.
3 . Aptitude is assessed at the beginning of the training
pipeline through scores on the ASVAB. Racial/ethnic
occupational representation is measured at the completion of
training and beyond. In relating the two, no provision is
made for personnel attrition from training. If a
racial/ethnic group fails to complete training in
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disproportionately higher percentages than another group
during this period then an additional margin of error is
introduced.
Given these limitations, the procedure has nonetheless
gained acceptance. It was published in Armed Forces &
Society , the respected journal of the Inter-University Seminar
on Armed Forces and Society, surviving the scrutiny of both
academic peers and journal editors. Major criticisms of the
procedure have not been unearthed by this author as yet.
D. THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER FACTORS
A considerable amount of work in this thesis was devoted
to studying the influence of aptitude on the distribution of
minorities within Navy ratings. Factors other than aptitude
may also exercise an important influence on occupational
placement outcomes. Though the identification of these
factors is not the focus of this study, they should at least
be recognized here.
Personal preference no doubt plays a major role in
occupation selection by members of all racial/ethnic groups.
No attempt was made to measure or estimate the influence of
this variable. It may well be that personal preference
outweighs all other considerations when a recruit selects a
career field. Meaningful research in this area would greatly
contribute to the body of knowledge concerning minority
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occupational placement and assist those charged with
monitoring Navy affirmative action programs.
Personal bias, intentional or otherwise, may also be a
determining factor. Though any respectable organization would
like to think that all traces of ethnic discrimination have
been eradicated from its midst, only the naive would believe
it to be so. The Navy devotes sufficiently ample resources to
ensure equal opportunity education and awareness for all Navy
personnel. Nonetheless, there are several situations in
which personal bias may affect the occupational distribution
of minorities:
1. A well-intentioned recruiter may unknowingly press his
stereotypes of minorities and jobs onto an eager, yet ill-
informed, recruit candidate.
2. Likewise, the "classifier," or career counselor at the
Military Examination and Processing Station (MEPS) also has an
opportunity to inject personal bias. The classifier's duty is
to match recruit preferences and qualifications with available
training openings. No one plays a larger part in the
distribution process than this person.
3. On the job, supervisors and managers evaluate
personnel performance. Their evaluations greatly influence
the retention and advancement of each of their subordinates,
and unintended bias may again be present.
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E. A FINAL NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY USED HERE
Gary Zucca completed his study in 1984. The methodology
developed by Zucca was replicated in this study. He used his
Core Technology model with 1982 data. The same model was run
using 1986 and 1990 data with the results reported here.
One startling conclusion that Zucca drew from his work was
that "racial inequalities in representation with regard to
occupational placement . . . are not explainable by
differences in human capital [REF. 5] ." This was a bold
statement at the time, when the common notion was that
disparities in minority occupational representation were the
result of a "lack of skills." Nevertheless, Zucca maintained
that the ethnic composition of Navy occupations, as Butler
(1976) and Nordlie et al . (1975) had discovered earlier for
the Army, cannot be fully attributed to differences in
aptitude.
This study suggests that Zucca was probably right. There
have been some incremental changes in the results due to the
time differential, but the findings are surprisingly
consistent with those of Zucca.
Naturally, any theoretical or methodological error in
Zucca' s Core Technology model would have been duplicated in
this study as well. Zucca conceded that his model could be
misspecif ied, and it is again acknowledged here. This study
was begun with the understanding that Zucca' s approach and
findings could prove to be flawed. However, only relatively
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minor defects could be found in what is otherwise a useful
method for assessing minority representation in Navy ratings.
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